

## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

for the  
Western District of Washington

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Apr 14, 2020	
CLERK U.S. DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT TACOMA BY DEPUTY	

In the Matter of the Search of  
*(Briefly describe the property to be searched  
or identify the person by name and address)*  
 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370 and  
 the person of Yusef Rahman Ali, more fully described  
 in Attachment A

) Case No. MJ20-5079

## APPLICATION FOR A SEARCH WARRANT

I, a federal law enforcement officer or an attorney for the government, request a search warrant and state under penalty of perjury that I have reason to believe that on the following person or property (*identify the person or describe the property to be searched and give its location*):

21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA, and a person more fully described in Attachment A, incorporated herein by reference.

located in the Western District of Washington, there is now concealed (*identify the person or describe the property to be seized*):

See Attachment B, incorporated herein by reference.

The basis for the search under Fed. R. Crim. P. 41(c) is (*check one or more*):

- evidence of a crime;
- contraband, fruits of crime, or other items illegally possessed;
- property designed for use, intended for use, or used in committing a crime;
- a person to be arrested or a person who is unlawfully restrained.


The search is related to a violation of:

Code Section	Offense Description
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2); and	Receipt or Distribution of Child Pornography
18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)	Possession of Child Pornography

The application is based on these facts:

- See Affidavit of Special Agent Byron E. Garcia, Department of the Navy, NCIS, continued on the attached sheet.
- Delayed notice of \_\_\_\_\_ days (give exact ending date if more than 30 days: \_\_\_\_\_) is requested under 18 U.S.C. § 3103a, the basis of which is set forth on the attached sheet.

Pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 4.1, this warrant is presented:  by reliable electronic means; or:  telephonically recorded.




BYRON E. GARCIA, Special Agent

Printed name and title

- The foregoing affidavit was sworn to before me and signed in my presence, or
- The above-named agent provided a sworn statement attesting to the truth of the foregoing affidavit by telephone.

Date: 04/14/2020



Judge's signature

City and state: Tacoma, Washington

J. RICHARD CREATURA, United States Magistrate Judge

Printed name and title

## ATTACHMENT A

## Items to be Searched

## **I. Description of the Property to be Searched (SUBJECT PREMISES)**

The physical address of the SUBJECT PREMISES is 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370. The SUBJECT PREMISES is more fully described as the property containing a driveway that led from the northwest corner of Windmill Loop NW toward a two-story, three-bedroom single-family house approximately 1,792 square feet built in 2012 in an approximately 8,276 square foot lot. The front door and garage door were on the south side of the house, with the front door closer to the southwest corner and the garage door closer to the southeast corner. The number “21789” appeared vertically on the westernmost frame surrounding the garage door. The house had tan or light-brown siding, white or cream-colored accents, brownish shutters, and greyish-shingled roof. The south side of the house had two windows on the first floor and three windows on the second floor. A wooden fence surrounded a backyard and inset patio on the north side of the house.

16 The search is to include all rooms, attics, basements, and all other parts therein,  
17 any garages, outbuildings, or storage rooms, attached or detached, and any digital  
18 device(s) found therein. Specifically, this warrant authorizes law enforcement to seize  
19 and search any digital device law enforcement has probable cause to believe is owned by  
20 or to which the SUBJECT PERSON has access. For any other digital device, law  
21 enforcement may seize that device under this warrant but may not search it without  
22 approval from the Court.



**II. Description of the Person to be Searched (SUBJECT PERSON)**

The person to be searched, YUSEF RAHMAN ALI, is an African American male born on XX/XX/1970.



ATTACHMENT A - 2  
USAO #2020R00218

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY  
1201 Pacific Ave., Suite 400  
Tacoma, Washington 98402  
(253) 428-3800

1                   **ATTACHMENT B**

2                   **Items to be Seized**

3                   The following records, documents, files, or materials, in whatever form, including  
4 handmade or mechanical form (such as printed, written, handwritten, or typed),  
5 photocopies or other photographic form, and electrical, electronic, and magnetic form  
6 (such as CDs, DVDs, smart cards, thumb drives, camera memory cards, electronic  
7 notebooks, or any other storage medium), that constitute evidence, instrumentalities, or  
8 fruits of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Receipt or Distribution of Child  
9 Pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Possession of Child Pornography) which  
10 may be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT PERSON.

11                  1. Any visual depiction of minor(s) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in  
12 any format or media.

13                  2. Evidence of any associated email accounts, instant message accounts or  
14 other communications or digital storage such as cloud accounts.

15                  3. Letters, e-mail, text messages, and other correspondence identifying  
16 persons transmitting child pornography, or evidencing the transmission of child  
17 pornography, through interstate or foreign commerce, including by mail or by computer;

18                  4. All invoices, purchase agreements, catalogs, canceled checks, money order  
19 receipts, credit card statements or other documents pertaining to the transportation or  
20 purchasing of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct;

21                  5. Any and all address books, names, lists of names, telephone numbers, and  
22 addresses of individuals engaged in the transfer, exchange, or sale of child pornography;

23                  6. Any and all address books, names, lists of names, telephone numbers, and  
24 addresses of minors;

25                  7. Any and all diaries, notebooks, notes, non-pornographic pictures of  
26 children, and any other records reflecting personal contact or other activities with minors.

1       8. Any non-digital recording devices and non-digital media capable of storing  
2 images and videos.

3       9. Digital devices and/or their components, which include, but are not limited  
4 to:

5           a. Any digital devices and storage device capable of being used to  
6 commit, further, or store evidence of the offense listed above, including but not limited to  
7 computers, digital cameras, and smart phones;

8           b. Any digital devices used to facilitate the transmission, creation,  
9 display, encoding or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems,  
10 docking stations, monitors, cameras, printers, encryption devices, and optical scanners;

11          c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of  
12 storing data, such as disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, DVDs, printer or  
13 memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives,  
14 camera memory cards, media cards, electronic notebooks, and personal digital assistants;

15          d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding  
16 the operation of the digital device or software;

17          e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other  
18 software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the computer hardware,  
19 storage devices, or data to be searched;

20          f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical  
21 items that are necessary to gain access to the computer equipment, storage devices or  
22 data; and

23          g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other  
24 information necessary to access the computer equipment, storage devices or data;

25       10. Evidence of who used, owned or controlled any seized digital device(s) at  
26 the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or deleted, such as logs,  
27 registry entries, saved user names and passwords, documents, and browsing history;

11. Evidence of malware that would allow others to control any seized digital device(s) such as viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software, as well as evidence of the presence or absence of security software designed to detect malware; as well as evidence of the lack of such malware;

12. Evidence of the attachment to the digital device(s) of other storage devices or similar containers for electronic evidence;

13. Evidence of counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from a digital device;

14. Evidence of times the digital device(s) was used;

15. Any other ESI from the digital device(s) necessary to understand how the digital device was used, the purpose of its use, who used it, and when.

## SEARCH TECHNIQUES

1. In this particular case, and in order to protect the third party privacy of innocent individuals residing in the residence, the following are search techniques that will be applied:

i. Device use and ownership will be determined through interviews, if possible, and through the identification of user account(s), associated account names, and log-ons associated with the device. Determination of whether a password is used to lock a user's profile on the device(s) will assist in knowing who had access to the device or whether the password prevented access.

## ii. Use of hash value library searches.

iii. Use of keyword searches, i.e., utilizing key words that are known to be associated with the sharing of child pornography.

iv. Identification of non-default programs that are commonly known to be used for the exchange and viewing of child pornography, such as, eMule, uTorrent, BitTorrent, Ares, Shareaza, Gnutella, etc.

1                         v.     Looking for file names indicative of child pornography, such as,  
2 PTHC, PTSC, Lolita, 3yo, etc. and file names identified during the undercover download  
3 of child pornography.

4                         vi.    Viewing of image files and video files.

5                         vii.   As indicated above, the search will be limited to evidence of child  
6 pornography and will not include looking for personal documents and files that are  
7 unrelated to the crime.

8                         2.     These search techniques may not all be required or used in a particular  
9 order for the identification of digital devices containing items set forth in Attachment B  
10 to this Affidavit. However, these search techniques will be used systematically in an  
11 effort to protect the privacy of third parties. Use of these tools will allow for the quick  
12 identification of items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit,  
13 and will also assist in the early exclusion of digital devices and/or files which do not fall  
14 within the scope of items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to this  
15 Affidavit.

16                         3.     In accordance with the information in this Affidavit, law enforcement  
17 personnel will execute the search of digital devices seized pursuant to this warrant as  
18 follows:

19                         a.     Upon securing the search site, the search team will conduct an initial  
20 review of any digital devices/systems to determine whether the ESI contained therein can  
21 be searched and/or duplicated on site in a reasonable amount of time and without  
22 jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data.

23                         b.     If, based on their training and experience, and the resources  
24 available to them at the search site, the search team determines it is not practical to make  
25 an on-site search, or to make an on-site copy of the ESI within a reasonable amount of  
26 time and without jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data, then the digital  
27 devices will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for  
28 review and to be forensically copied ("imaged"), as appropriate.

1                   c.     In order to examine the ESI in a forensically sound manner, law  
 2 enforcement personnel with appropriate expertise will produce a complete forensic  
 3 image, if possible and appropriate, of any digital device that is found to contain data or  
 4 items that fall within the scope of Attachment B of this Affidavit. In addition,  
 5 appropriately trained personnel may search for and attempt to recover deleted, hidden, or  
 6 encrypted data to determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 7 pursuant to the warrant. In order to search fully for the items identified in the warrant,  
 8 law enforcement personnel, which may include investigative agents, may then examine  
 9 all of the data contained in the forensic image/s and/or on the digital devices to view their  
 10 precise contents and determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 11 pursuant to the warrant.

12                   d.     The search techniques that will be used will be only those  
 13 methodologies, techniques and protocols as may reasonably be expected to find, identify,  
 14 segregate and/or duplicate the items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to  
 15 this Affidavit.

16                   e.     If, after conducting its examination, law enforcement personnel  
 17 determine that any digital device is an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced  
 18 above, the government may retain that device during the pendency of the case as  
 19 necessary to, among other things, preserve the instrumentality evidence for trial, ensure  
 20 the chain of custody, and litigate the issue of forfeiture. If law enforcement determines  
 21 that a particular digital device was not an instrumentality of the offenses listed above, that  
 22 device shall be returned to the person from whom it was seized within sixty days of the  
 23 date of the warrant, unless the government seeks and obtains permission from the Court  
 24 for its retention.

25                   4.     In order to search for ESI that falls within the list of items to be seized  
 26 pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit, law enforcement personnel will seize and  
 27 search the following items (heretofore and hereinafter referred to as "digital devices"),  
 28 subject to the procedures set forth above:

- 1           a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further, or store  
2 evidence of the offense(s) listed above;
- 3           b. Any digital device used to facilitate the transmission, creation,  
4 display, encoding, or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems,  
5 docking stations, monitors, printers, cameras, encryption devices, and optical scanners;
- 6           c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of  
7 storing data, such as disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, DVDs, printer or  
8 memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives,  
9 camera memory cards, media cards, electronic notebooks, and personal digital assistants;
- 10          d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding  
11 the operation of the digital device, or software;
- 12          e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other  
13 software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the device hardware, or  
14 ESI to be searched;
- 15          f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical  
16 items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device, or ESI; and
- 17          g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other  
18 information necessary to access the digital device or ESI.

19  
20 **The seizure of digital devices and/or their components as set forth herein is**  
21 **specifically authorized by this search warrant, not only to the extent that such**  
22 **digital devices constitute instrumentalities of the criminal activity described above,**  
23 **but also for the purpose of the conducting off-site examinations of their contents for**  
24 **evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of the aforementioned crimes.**

## AFFIDAVIT

STATE OF WASHINGTON  
COUNTY OF PIERCE

SS

I, Byron E. Garcia, being duly sworn, state as follows:

## I. INTRODUCTION AND AGENT BACKGROUND

8       1. I am a Special Agent with the Naval Criminal Investigative Service (NCIS)  
9 assigned to NCIS Resident Agency (NCISRA) Bangor, Washington, since December  
10 2018. The Department of the Navy authorized me to conduct investigations for offenses  
11 enumerated in Title 18, United States Code, and Title 10, United States Code, also known  
12 as the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), which affect the Department of the  
13 Navy, and specifically the United States Navy (USN) and United States Marine Corps  
14 (USMC). My duties include, but are not limited to, investigating crimes committed on or  
15 aboard naval installations, aircraft or vessels, committed by or against Navy or Marine  
16 Corps military personnel or civilian employees, or otherwise involving Department of the  
17 Navy assets, personnel, or facilities.

18       2. As part of my duties as an NCIS Special Agent, I investigate criminal  
19 violations relating to child exploitation and child pornography. I received training in the  
20 area of child pornography and child exploitation. I also participated in the execution of  
21 other search warrants involving investigations of child exploitation and/or child  
22 pornography offenses.

23       3. I make this Affidavit in support of an application under Rule 41 of the  
24 Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure for a warrant to search: the premises at 21789  
25 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, Washington 98370 (the “SUBJECT PREMISES”), and the  
26 person of YUSEF RAHMAN ALI (“SUBJECT PERSON”) more fully described in  
27 Attachment A to this Affidavit, for the property and items described in Attachment B to  
28 this Affidavit.

1       4. This application seeks a warrant to search the SUBJECT PREMISES and  
 2 the SUBJECT PERSON, and seize the items listed in Attachment B, which is attached to  
 3 this Affidavit and incorporated herein by reference, for evidence, fruits, and  
 4 instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Receipt or Distribution of Child  
 5 Pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Possession of Child Pornography).

6       5. The facts set forth in this Affidavit are based on the following: my own  
 7 personal knowledge; knowledge obtained from other individuals during my participation  
 8 in this investigation, including other law enforcement officers; interviews of witnesses;  
 9 my review of records related to this investigation; communications with others who have  
 10 knowledge of the events and circumstances described herein; and information gained  
 11 through my training and experience.

12      6. Because this Affidavit is submitted for the limited purpose of establishing  
 13 probable cause in support of the application for a search warrant, it does not set forth  
 14 each and every fact I or others have learned during the course of this investigation. I have  
 15 set forth only the facts I believe are relevant to the determination of probable cause to  
 16 believe evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2)  
 17 (Receipt or Distribution of Child Pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B)  
 18 (Possession of Child Pornography) will be found in the SUBJECT PREMISES and on the  
 19 SUBJECT PERSON.

## 20                   II. SUMMARY OF INVESTIGATION

21      7. On January 6, 2020, Special Agent Terrance POSTMA, Federal Bureau of  
 22 Investigation (FBI) Poulsbo Resident Agency, notified NCISRA Bangor, Washington,  
 23 the SUBJECT PERSON reportedly purchased and possessed child pornography from  
 24 David DRAKE, the subject of a separate FBI investigation. I contacted the FBI's  
 25 Birmingham Division, who provided copies of their reports, search warrant affidavit, and  
 26 evidence obtained during their investigation of DRAKE for the advertisement, sale, and  
 27 distribution of child pornography. My review of the copies of the aforementioned  
 28 reports, affidavit, and evidence revealed the following information.


1       8. On August 13, 2018, Tumblr submitted a CyberTip report to the National  
 2 Center for Missing and Exploited Children (NCMEC), CyberTipline Report: 38558313.  
 3 Tumblr is a public blogging and publishing platform acquired by Yahoo circa 2013, and  
 4 owned by Oath, Inc. The Tumblr service allows users to post multimedia to a public blog  
 5 page for other users to view. The Tumblr report identified a user who uploaded  
 6 approximately fifty (50) images and videos to Tumblr's servers, which depicted  
 7 prepubescent and pubescent adolescents in various stages of undress and engaged in  
 8 sexual acts. Tumblr reported the following subscriber information: User Name  
 9 stopjealous22 and Profile/Public Universal Record Locator (URL)  
 10 stopjealous22.tumblr.com.

11      9. On September 10, 2018, Yahoo, Inc. and Oath submitted a CyberTip report  
 12 to NCMEC, CyberTipLine Report: 40005612, as a supplement to the previously filed  
 13 CyberTipline Report: 38558313 from Tumblr. Yahoo, Inc. and Oath reported the  
 14 following information regarding the email accounts: stopjealous22@yahoo.com and  
 15 stopjealous22.tumblr.com: (1) the Yahoo account was created on July 12, 2018; (2) the  
 16 phone number provided for the Yahoo account is "+1-2058070069," (3) this phone  
 17 number was last verified on July 12, 2018, (4) the date of birth provided for the Yahoo  
 18 Account was May 18, 1999, (5) the last successful login to the Yahoo account was on  
 19 July 20, 2018, from Spectrum Business IP address 71.45.249.170, located in or around  
 20 Birmingham, Alabama, (6) the user provided description for Tumblr blog  
 21 stopjealous22.tumblr is "hmu on wickr sendmb6 30\$."

22      10. On September 25, 2018, FBI Special Agents acting in an undercover  
 23 capacity (UC) accessed the public online Tumblr blog, stopsleep8.tumblr.com. The blog  
 24 advertised the sale of child pornography and contained images and videos that depicted  
 25 prepubescent and pubescent boys in various stages of undress and engaged in sexual acts.  
 26 The title of the blog stated: "Wickr sendmb6 to buy links." Wickr is an instant messaging  
 27 app, which allows users to exchange end-to-end encrypted and content-expiring  
 28

1 messages, including photos, videos, and file attachments, and place end-to-end encrypted  
 2 video conference calls. Wickr messages automatically delete after six (6) days.

3       11. On September 26, 2018, the UC contacted the user “sendmb6” via the  
 4 Wickr application (app). The public avatar of “sendmb6” depicted the image of an adult  
 5 male having sex with a boy who appeared to be under the age of twelve (12).  
 6 “[S]endmb6” offered to sell the UC links to download videos of child pornography for  
 7 either \$30 or \$40 depending on the link requested. The user “sendmb6” subsequently  
 8 provided screenshots of a Mega Cloud Drive, which contained multiple folders that  
 9 potentially contained child pornography. Examples of the folder names contained within  
 10 the Mega Cloud Drive Account included “boy mix 40\$,” “boy on boy 40\$,” “and “boy  
 11 baby (40\$).”



23       12. On September 26, 2018, “sendmb6” offered to send the UC a sample video,  
 24 and subsequently provided the UC with a Mega link to download a sample video. The  
 25 sample video depicted a boy, who appeared under the age of twelve (12), performing oral  
 26 sex on an adult male in the shower.

27       13. “[S]endmb6” requested payment via Cash App or Amazon gift card from  
 28 the UC in order to complete the purchase of links. Cash App is a mobile payment service

1 developed by Square, Inc., which allows users to transfer money to one another using a  
 2 mobile phone app. The UC presented “sendmb6” with an Amazon gift card worth \$40 via  
 3 the Wickr app. “[S]endmb6” subsequently provided the UC with a link to a Mega folder  
 4 titled “boy on boy 40\$.” Mega is a cloud-based and file hosting service offered by Mega  
 5 Limited, a New Zealand-based company. The Mega link contained a folder with  
 6 approximately 641 videos. I reviewed copies of the aforementioned videos, which mostly  
 7 depicted prepubescent boys under the age of twelve (12), in various stages of undress,  
 8 engaged in sexual acts with other children and/or adult males.

9       14. The UC subsequently conducted two (2) additional controlled purchases  
 10 from DRAKE. The third controlled purchase resulted in access to one of DRAKE’s  
 11 Dropbox accounts. I reviewed copies of the contents of the aforementioned Dropbox  
 12 account, which contained approximately thirty (30) videos of prepubescent boys, most of  
 13 whom appeared to be under the age of twelve (12), in various stages of undress,  
 14 masturbating or engaged in sexual acts with other boys or adults.

15       15. The FBI served administrative subpoenas on Amazon.com Inc., Mega  
 16 Limited, and Square, Inc. requesting information related to the aforementioned accounts  
 17 associated with the user “sendmb6.” The FBI reviewed the responses, and subsequently  
 18 determined the user of “sendmb6” was DRAKE.

19       16. On May 30, 2019, the FBI interviewed DRAKE, who admitted the  
 20 following: DRAKE advertised, sold, and distributed child pornography from his Tumblr  
 21 page, and directed users to his “sendmb6” Wickr account to complete the sale of child  
 22 pornography. According to DRAKE, “sendmb6” stood for “send man/boy.” DRAKE  
 23 subsequently sent these users a screenshot of his collection for the user to decide which  
 24 folder the user wanted to purchase. DRAKE sold folders for \$10 to \$50, and divided each  
 25 folder by the type and genre of child pornography it contained (e.g. man/boy, boy/boy).  
 26 DRAKE accepted payment by Venmo, Cash App, or Amazon gift cards, and all  
 27 payments to his Venmo, Cash App, and Amazon accounts directly resulted from his sale  
 28

1 of child pornography. DRAKE subsequently plead guilty to a federal indictment for the  
 2 advertisement, sale, and possession of child pornography.

3       17. The FBI served an administrative subpoena to Square, Inc. regarding  
 4 DRAKE's Cash App account, which identified several users who potentially purchased  
 5 child pornography from DRAKE. According to Square, Inc. records, Cash App user  
 6 "Carl" completed eight (8) transactions to DRAKE between August 26, 2018 and  
 7 September 24, 2018.

8       18. The aforementioned administrative subpoena for Square, Inc. revealed the  
 9 following account profile information further revealed the following account profile  
 10 information for "Carl":

- 11           a. Customer Token: C\_hxpgjaybf
- 12           b. Display Name (History): Yusef Ali
- 13           c. Date of Birth: May 1, 1970
- 14           d. Last Four of Social: 1447
- 15           e. Email (History): jusbreath80@gmail.com
- 16           f. Cashtag (History): baaq80
- 17           g. Address: 21789 Windmill Loop, Poulsbo, WA 98370
- 18           h. Payment Source History: Navy Federal Credit Union card, ZIP Code  
 19 98370 (link created at 26 August 2018)
- 20           i. Virtual Card Number: 4403931914051280

21       19. Square, Inc. indicated in their response the identifiers for sending or  
 22 receiving peer-to-peer transactions included phone number, email, and Cashtag. Square,  
 23 Inc. further advised they left the date of birth and Social Security Number (SSN) fields  
 24 blank if the account had not met internal thresholds for identity verification. An Accurint  
 25 search for "Yusef ALI" revealed the following information:  
 26  
 27  
 28

- 1           a.     Name: Yusef R. Ali  
 2           b.     Address: 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370-9808  
 3           c.     DOB: May 1, 1970  
 4           d.     SSN: XXX-XX-1447

6       20.   On January 6, 2020, I reviewed the Official Military Personnel File  
 7 (OMPF) and database checks for the SUBJECT PERSON. The OMPF review revealed  
 8 the SUBJECT PERSON was an Electronics Technician, Submarine, Navigation (ETV) in  
 9 the United States Navy assigned to the Trident Refit Facility (TRF) in Naval Base Kitsap  
 10 Bangor, Washington, located in the Western District of Washington. The full name,  
 11 address, date of birth, and SSN in the SUBJECT PERSON's OMPF matched the  
 12 subscriber information associated with "Carl" account and the address for the SUBJECT  
 13 PREMISES. Database checks on Department of Defense Person Search (DPS) also  
 14 confirmed the SUBJECT PERSON's full name, SSN, date of birth, and address matched  
 15 the information associated with the "Carl" account and the address for the SUBJECT  
 16 PREMISES. DPS checks further revealed the SUBJECT PERSON's email address was  
 17 jus\_breath80@yahoo.com, which matched the username of the Gmail address associated  
 18 with the "Carl" account.

19      21.   On January 9, 2020, I served a 2703(d) court order on Square, Inc. to  
 20 disclose records and information associated with the "Carl" account from August 21,  
 21 2018, to present. On January 23, 2020, I received a response to the aforementioned  
 22 2703(d) court order, which included the Cash App account profile information for the  
 23 "Carl" account, the eight (8) Cash App transactions between this account and DRAKE,  
 24 and Internet Protocol (IP) logs from October 13, 2018, to October 22, 2019. The IP logs  
 25 revealed the "Carl" account used accessed Cash App on fifty-two (52) dates and times  
 26 using three (3) IP addresses. One of the IP addresses resolved to Verizon Wireless and  
 27 two (2) IP addresses resolved to Comcast Cable Communications. The "Carl" account  
 28 accessed Cash App using the Comcast IP address 24.22.228.102 (the "SUBJECT IP") for

1 the most recent forty-one (41) dates and times between October 22, 2018 to October 22,  
 2 2019.

3       22. On January 31, 2020, I served a 2703(d) court order requesting Comcast  
 4 Corporation disclose records and information associated with the SUBJECT IP. On  
 5 February 3, 2020, Comcast Corporation responded to the aforementioned 2703(d) court  
 6 order, which revealed Comcast could not identify a subscriber account on the dates on or  
 7 before 13 December 2018, but associated the SUBJECT IP on subsequent dates with the  
 8 following subscriber:

- 9           a.      Subscriber Name: [J.A]
- 10          b.      Service Address: 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 9837
- 11          c.      Billing Address: 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370
- 12          d.      Telephone No.: (360) 689-4353
- 13          e.      Type of Service: High Speed Internet Service
- 14          f.      Start of Service: Unknown
- 15          g.      Account Number: 8498360030804587
- 16          h.      Account Status: Active
- 17          i.      IP Assignment: Dynamically Assigned
- 18          j.      MAC Address: 00:1d:d0:69:8e:e2
- 19          k.      Email Users Ids: ladyjay1970@comcast.net

20       23. I further reviewed the Official Military Personnel File (OMPF) for the  
 21 SUBJECT PERSON, which revealed he married J.A. on November 19, 2005, and they  
 22 resided together in the SUBJECT PREMISES with their minor son as early as  
 23 approximately August 21, 2012. A review of Kitsap County records for the SUBJECT  
 24 PREMISES revealed calls for service from a Comcast alarm service from approximately  
 25 2012 to 2017.

1       24. As outlined above, multiple sources of information indicated the SUBJECT  
 2 PERSON currently resides at the SUBJECT PREMISES; resided there on the dates of the  
 3 eight (8) Cash App transactions between the SUBJECT PERSON and DRAKE; and  
 4 resided there on the most recent dates the SUBJECT PERSON accessed Cash App, which  
 5 the SUBJECT PERSON accessed via the SUBJECT IP. I know from my training and  
 6 experience Cash App users rarely, if ever, share their accounts. As detailed above, the  
 7 records and information for the “Carl” account matched the SUBJECT PERSON and the  
 8 SUBJECT PREMISES. I therefore believe it likely the SUBJECT PERSON is the user of  
 9 the “Carl” account, and he mostly recently and frequently accessed Cash App from the  
 10 SUBJECT PREMISES using the SUBJECT IP. Given DRAKE admitted he only used  
 11 Cash App to sell and distribute child pornography, there is probable cause to believe the  
 12 SUBJECT PERSON received and possessed child pornography from DRAKE.

13       25. NCIS conducted records checks and surveillance of the SUBJECT  
 14 PREMISES on multiple dates from January 7, 2020 to April 9, 2020, which revealed the  
 15 SUBJECT PERSON resides at the SUBJECT PREMISES with his wife J.A. and their 13-  
 16 year old son. The records checks and surveillance revealed no additional occupants in  
 17 the SUBJECT PREMISES. The SUBJECT PREMISES are located on 21789 Windmill  
 18 Loop NW, Poulsbo, Washington 98370, in the Western District of Washington.

### 19                   **III. TECHNICAL BACKGROUND**

20       26. Based on my training and experience, when an individual communicates  
 21 through the Internet, the individual leaves an IP address which identifies the individual  
 22 user by account and ISP (as described above). When an individual is using the Internet,  
 23 the individual’s IP address is visible to administrators of websites they visit. Further, the  
 24 individual’s IP address is broadcast during most Internet file and information exchanges  
 25 that occur.

26       27. Based on my training and experience, I know that most ISPs provide only  
 27 one IP address for each residential subscription. I also know that individuals often use  
 28 multiple digital devices within their home to access the Internet, including desktop and

1 laptop computers, tablets, and mobile phones. A device called a router is used to connect  
 2 multiple digital devices to the Internet via the public IP address assigned (to the  
 3 subscriber) by the ISP. A wireless router performs the functions of a router but also  
 4 includes the functions of a wireless access point, allowing (wireless equipped) digital  
 5 devices to connect to the Internet via radio waves, not cables. Based on my training and  
 6 experience, today many residential Internet customers use a wireless router to create a  
 7 computer network within their homes where users can simultaneously access the Internet  
 8 (with the same public IP address) with multiple digital devices.

9       28. Based on my training and experience and information provided to me by  
 10 computer forensic agents, I know that data can quickly and easily be transferred from one  
 11 digital device to another digital device. Data can be transferred from computers or other  
 12 digital devices to internal and/or external hard drives, tablets, mobile phones, and other  
 13 mobile devices via a USB cable or other wired connection. Data can also be transferred  
 14 between computers and digital devices by copying data to small, portable data storage  
 15 devices including USB (often referred to as “thumb”) drives, memory cards (Compact  
 16 Flash, SD, microSD, etc.) and memory card readers, and optical discs (CDs/DVDs).

17       29. As outlined above, residential Internet users can simultaneously access the  
 18 Internet in their homes with multiple digital devices. Also explained above is how data  
 19 can quickly and easily be transferred from one digital device to another through the use  
 20 of wired connections (hard drives, tablets, mobile phones, etc.) and portable storage  
 21 devices (USB drives, memory cards, optical discs). Therefore, a user could access the  
 22 Internet using their assigned public IP address, receive, transfer or download data, and  
 23 then transfer that data to other digital devices, which may or may not have been  
 24 connected to the Internet during the date and time of the specified transaction.

25       30. Based on my training and experience, I have learned that the computer’s  
 26 ability to store images and videos in digital form makes the computer itself an ideal  
 27 repository for child pornography. The size of hard drives used in computers (and other  
 28 digital devices) has grown tremendously within the last several years. Hard drives with

1 the capacity of four (4) terabytes (TB) are not uncommon. These drives can store  
 2 thousands of images and videos at very high resolution.

3       31. Based on my training and experience, and information provided to me by  
 4 other law enforcement officers, I know that people tend to use the same user names  
 5 across multiple accounts and email services.

6       32. Based on my training and experience, collectors and distributors of child  
 7 pornography also use online resources to retrieve and store child pornography, including  
 8 services offered by companies such as Google, Yahoo, Apple, and Dropbox, among  
 9 others. The online services allow a user to set up an account with a remote computing  
 10 service that provides email services and/or electronic storage of computer files in any  
 11 variety of formats. A user can set up an online storage account from any computer with  
 12 access to the Internet. Evidence of such online storage of child pornography is often  
 13 found on the user's computer. Even in cases where online storage is used, however,  
 14 evidence of child pornography can be found on the user's computer in most cases.

15      33. As is the case with most digital technology, communications by way of  
 16 computer can be saved or stored on the computer used for these purposes. Storing this  
 17 information can be intentional, i.e., by saving an email as a file on the computer or saving  
 18 the location of one's favorite websites in, for example, "bookmarked" files. Digital  
 19 information can also be retained unintentionally, e.g., traces of the path of an electronic  
 20 communication may be automatically stored in many places (e.g., temporary files or ISP  
 21 client software, among others). In addition to electronic communications, a computer  
 22 user's Internet activities generally leave traces or "footprints" and history files of the  
 23 browser application used. A forensic examiner often can recover evidence suggesting  
 24 whether a computer contains wireless software, and when certain files under investigation  
 25 were uploaded or downloaded. Such information is often maintained indefinitely until  
 26 overwritten by other data.

27      34. Based on my training and experience, I have learned that producers of child  
 28 pornography can produce image and video digital files from the average digital camera,

1 mobile phone, or tablet. These files can then be easily transferred from the mobile device  
 2 to a computer or other digital device, using the various methods described above. The  
 3 digital files can then be stored, manipulated, transferred, or printed directly from a  
 4 computer or other digital device. Digital files can also be edited in ways similar to those  
 5 by which a photograph may be altered; they can be lightened, darkened, cropped, or  
 6 otherwise manipulated. As a result of this technology, it is relatively inexpensive and  
 7 technically easy to produce, store, and distribute child pornography. In addition, there is  
 8 an added benefit to the child pornographer in that this method of production is a difficult  
 9 trail for law enforcement to follow.

10       35. As part of my training and experience, I have become familiar with the  
 11 structure of the Internet, and I know that connections between computers on the Internet  
 12 routinely cross state and international borders, even when the computers communicating  
 13 with each other are in the same state. Individuals and entities use the Internet to gain  
 14 access to a wide variety of information; to send information to, and receive information  
 15 from, other individuals; to conduct commercial transactions; and to communicate via  
 16 email.

17       36. Based on my training and experience, I know that cellular mobile phones  
 18 (often referred to as “smart phones”) have the capability to access the Internet and store  
 19 information, such as images and videos. As a result, an individual using a smart phone  
 20 can send, receive, and store files, including child pornography, without accessing a  
 21 personal computer or laptop. An individual using a smart phone can also easily connect  
 22 the device to a computer or other digital device, via a USB or similar cable, and transfer  
 23 data files from one digital device to another. Moreover, many media storage devices,  
 24 including smartphones and thumb drives, can easily be concealed and carried on an  
 25 individual’s person and smartphones and/or mobile phones are also often carried on an  
 26 individual’s person.

27       37. As set forth herein and in Attachment B to this Affidavit, I seek permission  
 28 to search for and seize evidence, fruits, and instrumentalities of the above-referenced

1    crimes that might be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT PERSON,  
 2    in whatever form they are found. It has been my experience that individuals involved in  
 3    child pornography often prefer to store images of child pornography in electronic form.  
 4    The ability to store images of child pornography in electronic form makes digital devices,  
 5    examples of which are enumerated in Attachment B to this Affidavit, an ideal repository  
 6    for child pornography because the images can be easily sent or received over the Internet.  
 7    As a result, one form in which these items may be found is as electronic evidence stored  
 8    on a digital device.

9                 38.    Based upon my knowledge, experience, and training in child pornography  
 10    investigations, and the training and experience of other law enforcement officers with  
 11    whom I have had discussions, I know that there are certain characteristics common to  
 12    individuals who have a sexualized interest in children and depictions of children:

13                 a.        They may receive sexual gratification, stimulation, and satisfaction  
 14    from contact with children; or from fantasies they may have viewing children engaged in  
 15    sexual activity or in sexually suggestive poses, such as in person, in photographs, or other  
 16    visual media; or from literature describing such activity.

17                 b.        They may collect sexually explicit or suggestive materials in a  
 18    variety of media, including photographs, magazines, motion pictures, videotapes, books,  
 19    slides, and/or drawings or other visual media. Such individuals often times use these  
 20    materials for their own sexual arousal and gratification. Further, they may use these  
 21    materials to lower the inhibitions of children they are attempting to seduce, to arouse the  
 22    selected child partner, or to demonstrate the desired sexual acts. These individuals may  
 23    keep records, to include names, contact information, and/or dates of these interactions, of  
 24    the children they have attempted to seduce, arouse, or with whom they have engaged in  
 25    the desired sexual acts.

26                 c.        They often maintain any “hard copies” of child pornographic  
 27    material that is, their pictures, films, video tapes, magazines, negatives, photographs,  
 28    correspondence, mailing lists, books, tape recordings, etc., in the privacy and security of

1 their home or some other secure location. These individuals typically retain these "hard  
 2 copies" of child pornographic material for many years, as they are highly valued.

3           d. Likewise, they often maintain their child pornography collections  
 4 that are in a digital or electronic format in a safe, secure and private environment, such as  
 5 a computer and surrounding area. These collections are often maintained for several years  
 6 and are kept close by, often at the individual's residence or some otherwise easily  
 7 accessible location, to enable the owner to view the collection, which is valued highly.

8           e. They also may correspond with and/or meet others to share  
 9 information and materials; rarely destroy correspondence from other child pornography  
 10 distributors/collectors; conceal such correspondence as they do their sexually explicit  
 11 material; and often maintain lists of names, addresses, and telephone numbers of  
 12 individuals with whom they have been in contact and who share the same interests in  
 13 child pornography.

14           f. They generally prefer not to be without their child pornography for  
 15 any prolonged time period. This behavior has been documented by law enforcement  
 16 officers involved in the investigation of child pornography throughout the world.

17           g. E-mail itself provides a convenient means by which individuals can  
 18 access a collection of child pornography from any computer, at any location with Internet  
 19 access. Such individuals therefore do not need to physically carry their collections with  
 20 them but rather can access them electronically. Furthermore, these collections can be  
 21 stored on email "cloud" servers, which allow users to store a large amount of material at  
 22 no cost, without leaving any physical evidence on the users' computer(s).

23           39. In addition to offenders who collect and store child pornography, law  
 24 enforcement has encountered offenders who obtain child pornography from the internet,  
 25 view the contents and subsequently delete the contraband, often after engaging in self-  
 26 gratification. In light of technological advancements, increasing Internet speeds and  
 27 worldwide availability of child sexual exploitative material, this phenomenon offers the  
 28 offender a sense of decreasing risk of being identified and/or apprehended with quantities

1 of contraband. This type of consumer is commonly referred to as a ‘seek and delete’  
 2 offender, knowing that the same or different contraband satisfying their interests remain  
 3 easily discoverable and accessible online for future viewing and self-gratification. I know  
 4 that, regardless of whether a person discards or collects child pornography he/she  
 5 accesses for purposes of viewing and sexual gratification, evidence of such activity is  
 6 likely to be found on computers and related digital devices, including storage media, used  
 7 by the person. This evidence may include the files themselves, logs of account access  
 8 events, contact lists of others engaged in trafficking of child pornography, backup files,  
 9 and other electronic artifacts that may be forensically recoverable.

10       40. Given the above-stated facts and based on my knowledge, training and  
 11 experience, along with my discussions with other law enforcement officers who  
 12 investigate child exploitation crimes, I believe that the SUBJECT PERSON has a  
 13 sexualized interest in children and depictions of children and that evidence of child  
 14 pornography is likely to be found on digital media devices, including mobile and/or  
 15 portable digital devices found at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT  
 16 PERSON.

17       41. Based on my training and experience, and that of computer forensic agents  
 18 that I work and collaborate with on a daily basis, I know that every type and kind of  
 19 information, data, record, sound or image can exist and be present as electronically stored  
 20 information (ESI) on any of a variety of computers, computer systems, digital devices,  
 21 and other electronic storage media. I also know that electronic evidence can be moved  
 22 easily from one digital device to another. As a result, I believe that electronic evidence  
 23 may be stored on any digital device present at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the  
 24 SUBJECT PERSON.

25       42. Based on my training and experience, and my consultation with computer  
 26 forensic agents who are familiar with searches of computers, I know that in some cases  
 27 the items set forth in Attachment B may take the form of files, documents, and other data  
 28 that is user-generated and found on a digital device. In other cases, these items may take

1 the form of other types of data - including in some cases data generated automatically by  
 2 the devices themselves.

3       43. Based on my training and experience, and my consultation with computer  
 4 forensic agents who are familiar with searches of computers, I believe that if digital  
 5 devices are found in the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT PERSON, there is  
 6 probable cause to believe that the items set forth in Attachment B will be stored in those  
 7 digital devices for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the following:

8           a. Once created, ESI can be stored for years in very little space and at  
 9 little or no cost. A great deal of ESI is created, and stored, moreover, even without a  
 10 conscious act on the part of the device operator. For example, files that have been viewed  
 11 via the Internet are sometimes automatically downloaded into a temporary Internet  
 12 directory or “cache,” without the knowledge of the device user. The browser often  
 13 maintains a fixed amount of hard drive space devoted to these files, and the files are only  
 14 overwritten as they are replaced with more recently viewed Internet pages or if a user  
 15 takes affirmative steps to delete them. This ESI may include relevant and significant  
 16 evidence regarding criminal activities, but also, and just as importantly, may include  
 17 evidence of the identity of the device user, and when and how the device was used. Most  
 18 often, some affirmative action is necessary to delete ESI. And even when such action has  
 19 been deliberately taken, ESI can often be recovered, months or even years later, using  
 20 forensic tools.

21           b. Wholly apart from data created directly (or indirectly) by user  
 22 generated files, digital devices - in particular, a computer’s internal hard drive - contain  
 23 electronic evidence of how a digital device has been used, what it has been used for, and  
 24 who has used it. This evidence can take the form of operating system configurations,  
 25 artifacts from operating systems or application operations, file system data structures, and  
 26 virtual memory “swap” or paging files. Computer users typically do not erase or delete  
 27 this evidence, because special software is typically required for that task. However, it is  
 28 technically possible for a user to use such specialized software to delete this type of

1 information - and, the use of such special software may itself result in ESI that is relevant  
 2 to the criminal investigation. In particular, to properly retrieve and analyze electronically  
 3 stored (computer) data, and to ensure accuracy and completeness of such data and to  
 4 prevent loss of the data either from accidental or programmed destruction, it is necessary  
 5 to conduct a forensic examination of the computers. To effect such accuracy and  
 6 completeness, it may also be necessary to analyze not only data storage devices, but also  
 7 peripheral devices which may be interdependent, the software to operate them, and  
 8 related instruction manuals containing directions concerning operation of the computer  
 9 and software.

#### **IV. SEARCH AND/OR SEIZURE OF DIGITAL DEVICES**

10 44. In addition, based on my training and experience and that of computer  
 11 forensic agents that I work and collaborate with on a daily basis, I know that in most  
 12 cases it is impossible to successfully conduct a complete, accurate, and reliable search for  
 13 electronic evidence stored on a digital device during the physical search of a search site  
 14 for a number of reasons, including but not limited to the following:

15 a. Technical Requirements: Searching digital devices for criminal  
 16 evidence is a highly technical process requiring specific expertise and a properly  
 17 controlled environment. The vast array of digital hardware and software available  
 18 requires even digital experts to specialize in particular systems and applications, so it is  
 19 difficult to know before a search which expert is qualified to analyze the particular  
 20 system(s) and electronic evidence found at a search site. As a result, it is not always  
 21 possible to bring to the search site all of the necessary personnel, technical manuals, and  
 22 specialized equipment to conduct a thorough search of every possible digital  
 23 device/system present. In addition, electronic evidence search protocols are exacting  
 24 scientific procedures designed to protect the integrity of the evidence and to recover even  
 25 hidden, erased, compressed, password-protected, or encrypted files. Since ESI is  
 26 extremely vulnerable to inadvertent or intentional modification or destruction (both from  
 27 external sources or from destructive code embedded in the system such as a "booby

1 trap"), a controlled environment is often essential to ensure its complete and accurate  
 2 analysis.

3                 b.         Volume of Evidence: The volume of data stored on many digital  
 4 devices is typically so large that it is impossible to search for criminal evidence in a  
 5 reasonable period of time during the execution of the physical search of a search site. A  
 6 single megabyte of storage space is the equivalent of 500 double-spaced pages of text. A  
 7 single gigabyte of storage space, or 1,000 megabytes, is the equivalent of 500,000  
 8 double-spaced pages of text. Computer hard drives are now being sold for personal  
 9 computers capable of storing up to two terabytes (2,000 gigabytes of data). Additionally,  
 10 this data may be stored in a variety of formats or may be encrypted (several new  
 11 commercially available operating systems provide for automatic encryption of data upon  
 12 shutdown of the computer).

13                 c.         Search Techniques: Searching the ESI for the items described in  
 14 Attachment B may require a range of data analysis techniques. In some cases, it is  
 15 possible for agents and analysts to conduct carefully targeted searches that can locate  
 16 evidence without requiring a time-consuming manual search through unrelated materials  
 17 that may be commingled with criminal evidence. In other cases, however, such  
 18 techniques may not yield the evidence described in the warrant, and law enforcement  
 19 personnel with appropriate expertise may need to conduct more extensive searches, such  
 20 as scanning areas of the disk not allocated to listed files, or peruse every file briefly to  
 21 determine whether it falls within the scope of the warrant.

22                 45.         In this particular case, the government anticipates the use of a hash value  
 23 library to exclude normal operating system files that do not need to be searched, which  
 24 will facilitate the search for evidence that does come within the items described in  
 25 Attachment B. Further, the government anticipates the use of hash values and known file  
 26 filters to assist the digital forensics examiners/agents in identifying known and or  
 27 suspected child pornography image files. Use of these tools will allow for the quick  
 28

1 identification of evidentiary files but also assist in the filtering of normal system files that  
 2 would have no bearing on the case.

3       46. Collectors of child pornography are known to transport their child  
 4 pornography collections, which are often stored on mobile and/or portable digital media  
 5 devices, with them throughout the day. In particular, I have consulted with law  
 6 enforcement officers with experience investigating child exploitation related crimes, and  
 7 have learned that collectors of child pornography have been found to transport their  
 8 collections stored on mobile and/or portable devices 1) within pockets on their person,  
 9 and 2) inside bags/backpacks that they carry, and/or 3) within compartments located  
 10 inside their vehicle.

11       47. Because multiple people share the SUBJECT PREMISES and in order to  
 12 protect the privacy of individuals who may not be suspects of criminal activity, executing  
 13 agents will attempt to determine onsite which resident or residents own or have access to  
 14 a given digital device. If executing agents can reasonably determine that the SUBJECT  
 15 PERSON does not own or have access to a particular device, they will not seize or search  
 16 that digital device.

17       48. However, if agents conducting the search nonetheless determine that it is  
 18 probable that the things described in this warrant could be found on any computer(s) or  
 19 digital device(s) in the residence, this application seeks permission to conduct an onsite  
 20 search of those computers and digital devices as well, using forensic software, to  
 21 determine if any child pornography is present. If, as a result of this onsite search, there is  
 22 no child pornography present on those computers or digital devices, then they will not be  
 23 searched further and will not be seized. However, agents will be authorized to seize any  
 24 computer or digital device owned or used by SUBJECT PERSON for off-site forensic  
 25 review, if an onsite forensic review is not possible or feasible.

26       49. In accordance with the information in this Affidavit, law enforcement  
 27 personnel will execute the search of digital devices seized pursuant to this warrant as  
 28 follows:

1                   a. Upon securing the search site, the search team will conduct an initial  
 2 review of any digital devices/systems to determine whether the ESI contained therein can  
 3 be searched and/or duplicated on site in a reasonable amount of time and without  
 4 jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data.

5                   b. If, based on their training and experience, and the resources  
 6 available to them at the search site, the search team determines it is not practical to make  
 7 an on-site search, or to make an on-site copy of the ESI within a reasonable amount of  
 8 time and without jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data, then the digital  
 9 devices will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for  
 10 review and to be forensically copied ("imaged"), as appropriate.

11                  c. In order to examine the ESI in a forensically sound manner, law  
 12 enforcement personnel with appropriate expertise will produce a complete forensic  
 13 image, if possible and appropriate, of any digital device that is found to contain data or  
 14 items that fall within the scope of Attachment B of this Affidavit. In addition,  
 15 appropriately trained personnel may search for and attempt to recover deleted, hidden, or  
 16 encrypted data to determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 17 pursuant to the warrant. In order to search fully for the items identified in the warrant,  
 18 law enforcement personnel, which may include investigative agents, may then examine  
 19 all of the data contained in the forensic image/s and/or on the digital devices to view their  
 20 precise contents and determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 21 pursuant to the warrant.

22                  d. The search techniques that will be used will be only those  
 23 methodologies, techniques and protocols as may reasonably be expected to find, identify,  
 24 segregate and/or duplicate the items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to  
 25 this Affidavit.

26                  e. If, after conducting its examination, law enforcement personnel  
 27 determine that any digital device is an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced  
 28 above, the government may retain that device during the pendency of the case as

1 necessary to, among other things, preserve the instrumentality evidence for trial, ensure  
 2 the chain of custody, and litigate the issue of forfeiture. If law enforcement personnel  
 3 determine that a device was not an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced  
 4 above, it shall be returned to the person/entity from whom it was seized within sixty days  
 5 of the date of the warrant, unless the government seeks and obtains permission from the  
 6 Court for its retention.

7       50. In order to search for ESI that falls within the list of items to be seized  
 8 pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit, law enforcement personnel will seize and  
 9 search the following items (heretofore and hereinafter referred to as "digital devices"),  
 10 subject to the procedures set forth above:

11           a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further, or store  
 12 evidence of the offense(s) listed above;

13           b. Any digital device used to facilitate the transmission, creation,  
 14 display, encoding, or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems,  
 15 docking stations, monitors, printers, cameras, encryption devices, and optical scanners;

16           c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of  
 17 storing data, such as disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, DVDs, printer or  
 18 memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives,  
 19 camera memory cards, media cards, electronic notebooks, and personal digital assistants;

20           d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding  
 21 the operation of the digital device, or software;

22           e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other  
 23 software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the device hardware, or  
 24 ESI to be searched;

25           f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical  
 26 items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device, or ESI; and

27           g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other  
 28 information necessary to access the digital device or ESI.

1                   **V. GENUINE RISKS OF DESTRUCTION OF EVIDENCE**

2       51. Any other means of obtaining the necessary evidence to prove the elements  
3 of computer/Internet-related crimes, for example, a consent search, could result in an  
4 unacceptable risk of the loss/destruction of the evidence sought. If agents pursued a  
5 consent-based interview of and/or a consent-based search of digital media belonging to  
6 the SUBJECT PERSON at the SUBJECT PREMISES, he could rightfully refuse to give  
7 consent and subsequently destroy all evidence of the crime before agents could return  
8 with a search warrant. Based on my knowledge, training and experience, the only  
9 effective means of collecting and preserving the required evidence in this case is through  
10 a search warrant.

11                   **VI. CONCLUSION**

12       52. Based on the foregoing, I believe there is probable cause that evidence,  
13 fruits, and instrumentalities of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Receipt or  
14 Distribution of Child Pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Possession of Child  
15 Pornography) are located at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT PERSON, as  
16 more fully described in Attachment A to this Affidavit, as well as on and in any digital

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1 devices found therein. I therefore request that the court issue a warrant authorizing a  
2 search of the SUBJECT PREMISES and on the SUBJECT PERSON for the items more  
3 fully described in Attachment B.

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BYRON E. GARCIA,  
Affiant, Special Agent  
Department of the Navy  
Naval Criminal Investigative Service

10 Subscribed and sworn to before me this 14th day of April, 2020.  
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J. RICHARD CREATURA  
United States Magistrate Judge

## ATTACHMENT A

## Items to be Searched

## I. Description of the Property to be Searched (SUBJECT PREMISES)

The physical address of the SUBJECT PREMISES is 21789 Windmill Loop NW, Poulsbo, WA 98370. The SUBJECT PREMISES is more fully described as the property containing a driveway that led from the northwest corner of Windmill Loop NW toward a two-story, three-bedroom single-family house approximately 1,792 square feet built in 2012 in an approximately 8,276 square foot lot. The front door and garage door were on the south side of the house, with the front door closer to the southwest corner and the garage door closer to the southeast corner. The number “21789” appeared vertically on the westernmost frame surrounding the garage door. The house had tan or light-brown siding, white or cream-colored accents, brownish shutters, and greyish-shingled roof. The south side of the house had two windows on the first floor and three windows on the second floor. A wooden fence surrounded a backyard and inset patio on the north side of the house.

16 The search is to include all rooms, attics, basements, and all other parts therein,  
17 any garages, outbuildings, or storage rooms, attached or detached, and any digital  
18 device(s) found therein. Specifically, this warrant authorizes law enforcement to seize  
19 and search any digital device law enforcement has probable cause to believe is owned by  
20 or to which the SUBJECT PERSON has access. ~~For any other digital device, law~~  
21 ~~enforcement may seize that device under this warrant but may not search it without~~ *J*  
22 ~~approval from the Court.~~

JRC



**II. Description of the Person to be Searched (SUBJECT PERSON)**

The person to be searched, YUSEF RAHMAN ALI, is an African American male born on XX/XX/1970.



ATTACHMENT A - 2  
USAO #2020R00218

UNITED STATES ATTORNEY  
1201 Pacific Ave., Suite 400  
Tacoma, Washington 98402  
(253) 428-3800

## **ATTACHMENT B**

### **Items to be Seized**

The following records, documents, files, or materials, in whatever form, including  
handmade or mechanical form (such as printed, written, handwritten, or typed),  
photocopies or other photographic form, and electrical, electronic, and magnetic form  
(such as CDs, DVDs, smart cards, thumb drives, camera memory cards, electronic  
notebooks, or any other storage medium), that constitute evidence, instrumentalities, or  
fruits of violations of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(2) (Receipt or Distribution of Child  
Pornography) and 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) (Possession of Child Pornography) which  
may be found at the SUBJECT PREMISES or on the SUBJECT PERSON.

11        1. Any visual depiction of minor(s) engaged in sexually explicit conduct, in  
12 any format or media.

13        2. Evidence of any associated email accounts, instant message accounts or  
14 other communications or digital storage such as cloud accounts.

15       3. Letters, e-mail, text messages, and other correspondence identifying  
16 persons transmitting child pornography, or evidencing the transmission of child  
17 pornography, through interstate or foreign commerce, including by mail or by computer;

18       4. All invoices, purchase agreements, catalogs, canceled checks, money order  
19 receipts, credit card statements or other documents pertaining to the transportation or  
20 purchasing of images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct;

21       5. Any and all address books, names, lists of names, telephone numbers, and  
22 addresses of individuals engaged in the transfer, exchange, or sale of child pornography;

23       6. Any and all address books, names, lists of names, telephone numbers, and  
24 addresses of minors;

7. Any and all diaries, notebooks, notes, non-pornographic pictures of children, and any other records reflecting personal contact or other activities with minors.

1       8. Any non-digital recording devices and non-digital media capable of storing  
2 images and videos.

3       9. Digital devices and/or their components, which include, but are not limited  
4 to:

5           a. Any digital devices and storage device capable of being used to  
6 commit, further, or store evidence of the offense listed above, including but not limited to  
7 computers, digital cameras, and smart phones;

8           b. Any digital devices used to facilitate the transmission, creation,  
9 display, encoding or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems,  
10 docking stations, monitors, cameras, printers, encryption devices, and optical scanners;

11          c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of  
12 storing data, such as disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, DVDs, printer or  
13 memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives,  
14 camera memory cards, media cards, electronic notebooks, and personal digital assistants;

15          d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding  
16 the operation of the digital device or software;

17          e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other  
18 software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the computer hardware,  
19 storage devices, or data to be searched;

20          f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical  
21 items that are necessary to gain access to the computer equipment, storage devices or  
22 data; and

23          g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other  
24 information necessary to access the computer equipment, storage devices or data;

25       10. Evidence of who used, owned or controlled any seized digital device(s) at  
26 the time the things described in this warrant were created, edited, or deleted, such as logs,  
27 registry entries, saved user names and passwords, documents, and browsing history;

11. Evidence of malware that would allow others to control any seized digital device(s) such as viruses, Trojan horses, and other forms of malicious software, as well as evidence of the presence or absence of security software designed to detect malware; as well as evidence of the lack of such malware;

12. Evidence of the attachment to the digital device(s) of other storage devices or similar containers for electronic evidence;

13. Evidence of counter-forensic programs (and associated data) that are designed to eliminate data from a digital device;

14. Evidence of times the digital device(s) was used;

15. Any other ESI from the digital device(s) necessary to understand how the digital device was used, the purpose of its use, who used it, and when.

## SEARCH TECHNIQUES

1. In this particular case, and in order to protect the third party privacy of innocent individuals residing in the residence, the following are search techniques that will be applied:

i. Device use and ownership will be determined through interviews, if possible, and through the identification of user account(s), associated account names, and log-ons associated with the device. Determination of whether a password is used to lock a user's profile on the device(s) will assist in knowing who had access to the device or whether the password prevented access.

## ii. Use of hash value library searches.

iii. Use of keyword searches, i.e., utilizing key words that are known to be associated with the sharing of child pornography.

iv. Identification of non-default programs that are commonly known to be used for the exchange and viewing of child pornography, such as, eMule, uTorrent, BitTorrent, Ares, Shareaza, Gnutella, etc.

1                         v.     Looking for file names indicative of child pornography, such as,  
 2 PTHC, PTSC, Lolita, 3yo, etc. and file names identified during the undercover download  
 3 of child pornography.

4                         vi.    Viewing of image files and video files.

5                         vii.   As indicated above, the search will be limited to evidence of child  
 6 pornography and will not include looking for personal documents and files that are  
 7 unrelated to the crime.

8                         2.     These search techniques may not all be required or used in a particular  
 9 order for the identification of digital devices containing items set forth in Attachment B  
 10 to this Affidavit. However, these search techniques will be used systematically in an  
 11 effort to protect the privacy of third parties. Use of these tools will allow for the quick  
 12 identification of items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit,  
 13 and will also assist in the early exclusion of digital devices and/or files which do not fall  
 14 within the scope of items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to this  
 15 Affidavit.

16                         3.     In accordance with the information in this Affidavit, law enforcement  
 17 personnel will execute the search of digital devices seized pursuant to this warrant as  
 18 follows:

19                         a.     Upon securing the search site, the search team will conduct an initial  
 20 review of any digital devices/systems to determine whether the ESI contained therein can  
 21 be searched and/or duplicated on site in a reasonable amount of time and without  
 22 jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data.

23                         b.     If, based on their training and experience, and the resources  
 24 available to them at the search site, the search team determines it is not practical to make  
 25 an on-site search, or to make an on-site copy of the ESI within a reasonable amount of  
 26 time and without jeopardizing the ability to accurately preserve the data, then the digital  
 27 devices will be seized and transported to an appropriate law enforcement laboratory for  
 28 review and to be forensically copied ("imaged"), as appropriate.

1                   c.     In order to examine the ESI in a forensically sound manner, law  
 2 enforcement personnel with appropriate expertise will produce a complete forensic  
 3 image, if possible and appropriate, of any digital device that is found to contain data or  
 4 items that fall within the scope of Attachment B of this Affidavit. In addition,  
 5 appropriately trained personnel may search for and attempt to recover deleted, hidden, or  
 6 encrypted data to determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 7 pursuant to the warrant. In order to search fully for the items identified in the warrant,  
 8 law enforcement personnel, which may include investigative agents, may then examine  
 9 all of the data contained in the forensic image/s and/or on the digital devices to view their  
 10 precise contents and determine whether the data fall within the list of items to be seized  
 11 pursuant to the warrant.

12                   d.     The search techniques that will be used will be only those  
 13 methodologies, techniques and protocols as may reasonably be expected to find, identify,  
 14 segregate and/or duplicate the items authorized to be seized pursuant to Attachment B to  
 15 this Affidavit.

16                   e.     If, after conducting its examination, law enforcement personnel  
 17 determine that any digital device is an instrumentality of the criminal offenses referenced  
 18 above, the government may retain that device during the pendency of the case as  
 19 necessary to, among other things, preserve the instrumentality evidence for trial, ensure  
 20 the chain of custody, and litigate the issue of forfeiture. If law enforcement determines  
 21 that a particular digital device was not an instrumentality of the offenses listed above, that  
 22 device shall be returned to the person from whom it was seized within sixty days of the  
 23 date of the warrant, unless the government seeks and obtains permission from the Court  
 24 for its retention.

25                   4.     In order to search for ESI that falls within the list of items to be seized  
 26 pursuant to Attachment B to this Affidavit, law enforcement personnel will seize and  
 27 search the following items (heretofore and hereinafter referred to as "digital devices"),  
 28 subject to the procedures set forth above:

- 1           a. Any digital device capable of being used to commit, further, or store  
2 evidence of the offense(s) listed above;
- 3           b. Any digital device used to facilitate the transmission, creation,  
4 display, encoding, or storage of data, including word processing equipment, modems,  
5 docking stations, monitors, printers, cameras, encryption devices, and optical scanners;
- 6           c. Any magnetic, electronic, or optical storage device capable of  
7 storing data, such as disks, tapes, CD-ROMs, CD-Rs, CD-RWs, DVDs, printer or  
8 memory buffers, smart cards, PC cards, memory sticks, flash drives, thumb drives,  
9 camera memory cards, media cards, electronic notebooks, and personal digital assistants;
- 10          d. Any documentation, operating logs and reference manuals regarding  
11 the operation of the digital device, or software;
- 12          e. Any applications, utility programs, compilers, interpreters, and other  
13 software used to facilitate direct or indirect communication with the device hardware, or  
14 ESI to be searched;
- 15          f. Any physical keys, encryption devices, dongles and similar physical  
16 items that are necessary to gain access to the digital device, or ESI; and
- 17          g. Any passwords, password files, test keys, encryption codes or other  
18 information necessary to access the digital device or ESI.

19  
20 **The seizure of digital devices and/or their components as set forth herein is**  
21 **specifically authorized by this search warrant, not only to the extent that such**  
22 **digital devices constitute instrumentalities of the criminal activity described above,**  
23 **but also for the purpose of the conducting off-site examinations of their contents for**  
24 **evidence, instrumentalities, or fruits of the aforementioned crimes.**